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ABSTRACT 
Israeli Arabs are torn between their Palestinian identity and their Israeli 
citizenship.  Discrimination against Arabs is evident in numerous aspects of Israeli 
society such as the declaration of the country as a Jewish state, unequal state funding of 
Arab and Jewish programs, and the expropriation of Arab lands.  Most studies of 
collective action and social mobilization predict that repressed groups will eventually 
mobilize if inclusion in the political process is denied. This has not been the case among 
Israeli Arabs because they are allowed to vote, but there are still many rights that are 
reserved for the Jewish majority.  Discriminatory policies against Israeli Arabs may serve 
as short term solutions for the Jewish majority, but they will also create long term 
problems for the state.   
This research will use social movement theory to analyze the situation of Israeli 
Arabs in order to determine the probability for their collective action against the state.  
The conclusion states that, among Arab citizens, a regional Palestinian identity is 
beginning to overshadow the Israeli identity.  A new generation of educated and 
disgruntled Israeli Arabs is rising up to take ownership of the new identity which could 
lead to future collective action against the state.   
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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has dominated international headlines since the 
founding of Israel in 1948. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel gained possession of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip along with all the Palestinian Arabs living on the land. For 
the past forty years, the Palestinians in the occupied territories have displayed unity and 
dedication in their fight against Israel. Throughout the violence and bloodshed, there has 
always been one vital group that remains relatively silent within Israel’s borders. They 
are the Palestinians who refused to leave their land in 1948 and became citizens of the 
new state. Israeli Arabs are torn between their Palestinian identity and their Israeli 
citizenship. Azmi Bishara, a former Arab member of the Israeli Knesset, adequately 
explained the complex nature of Israeli Arab citizenship: 
We got citizenship in order to stay on our land in 1948 after most of our 
people were driven out into exile. The people who stayed here did not 
immigrate here, this is our country. That is why you cannot deal with us 
on issues of loyalty. This state came here and was enforced on the ruins of 
my nation. I accepted citizenship to be able to live here, and I will not do 
anything, security-wise, against the state. I am not going to conspire 
against the state, but you cannot ask me every day if I am loyal to the 
state. Citizenship demands from me to be loyal to the law, but not to the 
values or ideologies of the state. It is enough to be loyal to the law.1 
Many Israeli Arabs simply do not want to “rock the boat,” as they only make up about 
twenty percent of Israel’s population, but the Jewish majority also plays a role in keeping 
the Arabs politically ineffective.2 Most studies of collective action and social 
mobilization would predict that repressed groups eventually mobilize if inclusion in the 
political process is denied. This has not been the case among Israeli Arabs because they 
are allowed to vote, but there are still many rights that are reserved for the Jewish 
majority. This discrimination is evident in numerous aspects of Israeli society such as the 
                                                 
1 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Hated and Feted,” The Guardian (London), March 23, 2002, 
http://www.nexis.com (accessed on 11 October 2007). 
2 Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1980), 87. 
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declaration of the country as a Jewish state, “unequal funding of local [Arab] councils, 
education, and development projects,” and expropriation of Arab lands.3  
Israeli Arabs are suffering from an identity dilemma, but the state is also trying to 
maintain its historical Jewish identity, which explains many of the biased practices 
mentioned above.  Kimmerling wrote that “after the establishment of the new state of 
Israel, the Arabs who remained were considered a hostile minority, a kind of Trojan 
horse, a potential danger to the fundamental security of the nation.”4  These fears were 
justifiable given the circumstances of the 1948 war and the several Israeli-Arab wars that 
followed, but the Arab minority in Israel has continuously showed its loyalty to the 
democratic state.  Unfortunately, their loyalty is met with continued suspicion and 
distrust.  Aside from security issues, the Jewish majority also views the Arabs as a 
demographic threat.  The Israeli Arab birthrate is much higher than that of the Jewish 
population and the government fears an eventual loss of the Jewish majority status.  
While this observation is based more on speculation than reality, it still strikes a nerve 
with many Israeli Jews.  “Perhaps the issue is a carryover from the British mandate 
period when the numbers of Jews entering Palestine were restricted.  Added to this is the 
devastating demographic impact of the European Holocaust on the Jewish population of 
Europe.”5  The Jews have a historical awareness of their population size along with any 
threats that might endanger it.  The discriminatory policies against Israeli Arabs may 
serve as short term solutions for the Jewish majority, but they will also create long term 
problems for the state.  While Palestinians in the diaspora and the occupied territories 
have grievances against Israel, the legitimacy of the protests of these groups would 
increase with the consistent inclusion of Israeli Arabs.  Among the three Palestinian 
groups, the Israeli Arabs seem to be in the best position to protest Israel’s government  
 
 
                                                 
3 Sammy Smooha, Arabs and Jews in Israel, Vol. 2: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 157. 
4 Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001), 96. 
5 Calvin Goldscheider, Cultures in Conflict: The Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Greenwood Press, 
2002), 70. 
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and represent the other two groups in a non-violent manner. On the other hand, they also 
have the most to lose among the three groups if they take part in collective action against 
the Israeli government.  
Is there a tipping point in discrimination for Arab citizens of Israel, causing them 
to relate theirs to the plight of Palestinian groups outside of Israel and disassociate 
themselves from their Israeli identities?  In this paper, I attempt to answer this question 
by first examining the unequal practices of the Israeli government toward its Israeli Arab 
population. I then use social movement theory (SMT) to analyze the actions of Israeli 
Arabs during the second intifada and the causes for increased but still limited political 
mobilization and assertion of their Arab identity.  Finally, I address events between 2000 
and 2007 that further alienated the Arab minority and made them a captive audience for 
social movement organizations.  SMT serves as the structural framework for the 
argument throughout the paper.  I conclude that Israeli Arabs are in the process of 
embracing a new identity that has emerged from Palestinian nationalism.  The consistent 
discrimination by the Jewish majority serves as a constant reminder of the Arab need for 
an identity that is separate from the Jewish state.  A new generation of educated and 
disgruntled Arabs is rising up to take ownership of the new identity.  Their proper use of 
mobilizing structures and frames within Arab society could open the door for more 
political opportunities or start another intifada that is capable of sustained collective 
action.         
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 It is an accepted reality among scholars that Arab citizens of Israel do not enjoy 
all the benefits of citizenship as their Jewish peers.  Arabs only represent around twenty 
percent of Israel’s population and the Jewish majority consistently implements policies in 
order to maintain the status quo.  The difference in opinion stems from whether or not the 
Israeli Arabs have the potential to collectively mobilize against the state.  The 
predominant argument claims they do not because the Israeli government maintains 
Jewish dominance in society through the seizure of Arab lands, “institutionalized 
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segregation,” and other discriminatory practices.6  This argument tends to characterize 
the Arabs as a powerless minority that is unwilling to mobilize due to their relatively 
higher standard of living compared to Arabs in other Middle East countries, state co-
optation, and a lack of organizational structures within Arab civil society.7  This 
viewpoint is argued by many scholars such as Ian Lustick, Baruch Kimmerling, and Joel 
Migdal, but it is becoming outdated.   
The contrasting argument, championed by Magid Shihade, Dan Rabinowitz and 
Khawla Abu-Baker, and Laurence Louer states that the Israeli Arab population is far 
from helpless and that there is an “emergence among the Palestinian citizens of Israel of a 
new sociological generation that [Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker] label the Stand-Tall 
Generation.”8  The Arab minority is becoming more capable of collective action as they 
lose hope in gaining equality through the political process.  Regardless of which 
argument is correct, both groups provide important insight on the factors that might lead 
to Israeli Arab collective action against the state of Israel. 
 In their book, Palestinians: The Making of a People, Migdal and Kimmerling 
stress that the Arab citizens of Israel lack the necessary organization to rise up against the 
Jewish state.  In turn, “the central task of national reconstruction has fallen to those 
remaining outside Israel – both in Arab Palestine and in the new Palestinian communities 
beyond the borders of the old British mandate.”9  The authors stress that even when 
Palestinians inside Israel united in a common cause with their brethren in the occupied 
territories during the first intifada, there was a lack of organization within the uprising.  
“When the rioting broke out, Israeli civil administrators turned to the village mukhtars 
and the old notable leadership, who, to the astonishment of the Israelis…could do little to 
stem the tide of resistance.  It had become uncertain precisely where authority within 
                                                 
6 Oren Yiftachel, “Democracy or Ethnocracy?: Territory and Settler Politics in Israel/Palestine” in 
Middle East Report, No. 207, (Summer 1998), 11. 
7 Lustick, 129 
8 Dan Rabinowitz and Khawla Abu-Baker, Coffins on Our Shoulders: The Experience of the 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 2. 
9 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People, NY: The Free Press, 
1993), 184. 
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Palestinian society lay.”10  Migdal and Kimmerling also address how the Israeli Arabs, 
once seen as a possible “revolutionary force” for the Palestinian cause, became relatively 
content with their situation in comparison to the Palestinians outside of Israel.11  “Israel’s 
Arabs found themselves with better economic and cultural conditions, higher morale, and 
more political freedom.  Few of them seemed ready to trade their positions in the Jewish 
state for the lot of their brothers.”12  The reluctance to give up their comparatively better 
positions had a direct effect on the Israeli Arabs participation in the intifadas.  Providing 
full support for the Palestinian cause came with greater risks than perceived benefits, so 
they stood on the sidelines for the majority of the uprising.  “Even at the tensest moment 
in the midst of a clash with police during the general strike in December, 1987, [Israeli-
Arabs] were careful to draw a firm boundary between support for the intifada – consisting 
for the most part of raising money for its Arab victims – and their own participation in 
it.”13   
 Adding to the argument, Lustick claims that “the failure of Israel’s Arab minority 
to ‘organize itself’ and the minimal significance, to date, of the communal segmentation 
of Israeli society for the operation and stability of the Israeli political system are due to 
the presence of a highly effective system of control which, since 1948, has operated over 
Israeli Arabs.”14  His book then goes on to describe each way that the Israeli government 
controls the Arab minority.  The position posed by Migdal, Kimmerling, and Lustick is 
the most accepted and widely publicized view used to explain the lack of mobilization 
among Israeli Arabs.  However, the opposing viewpoint is becoming more applicable to 
the current state of affairs in Israel.  
In his article, “Internal Violence: State’s Role and Society’s Reponses,” Shihade 
argues that strong Palestinian social structures do exist and they have been successful in 
protesting against the Israeli government and policing internal conflicts.  Shihade directly 
counters the arguments of Lustick, Migdal, and Kimmerling and refers to them as “an 
                                                 
10 Kimmerling and Migdal, 274. 
11 Ibid., 180. 
12 Ibid., 181. 
13 Ibid., 181-182. 
14 Lustick, 25. 
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inaccurate picture and a simplistic explanation of the relationship between the Israeli state 
and its Palestinian Arab citizens.”15  The majority of his argument concerning Israeli 
Arabs and the Israeli state is summed up in the following quote: 
If the Palestinian Arab community was, in fact, weak (traditional, tribal, 
vulnerable to co-optation and intimidation or corrupt), as [Lustick, Migdal, 
and Kimmerling] suggest, then we would have seen greater success in the 
Israeli state policy of divide and rule, and in the intended alienation and 
division of Arab Palestinian citizens.  In other words, the state would have 
by now succeeded in creating communal wars between different Arab 
religious groups; but this is not the case.16 
Shihade is fully aware that Israel discriminates against its Arab citizens, but he stresses 
that Palestinian Arab Israelis are not helpless and should not be treated in such a fashion.  
His argument that the state has failed to create communal wars between Arab groups is 
valid, but he fails to mention that the state consistently represses the Arab minority with 
few repercussions. Israeli Arabs may not be helpless, but they have been unable to 
realistically challenge the status quo in Israel.  More recent events may point toward a 
new trend. 
In her book, To be an Arab in Israel, Louer stresses the difficulties faced by 
Israeli Arabs in the Jewish state.  Published in 2007, her book addresses some of the most 
recent trends leading toward Arab collective action in Israel.  According to Louer, much 
of the dissent among the Arab population currently stems from limited inclusion in the 
political process.  Noteworthy events to support her argument were the Israeli Arab 
election boycott in 2001 and the fifty-six percent electoral participation rate in 2006.17  
Louer concludes that “the most serious threat [posed by Israeli Arabs] may be yet to 
come […and] it would be the result of the failure of the Israeli political establishment, 
and especially Labour, to bring to fulfillment its partnership with the Arabs.”18  Louer 
focuses on the importance of a collective identity among the Arab minority and she 
                                                 
15 Magid Shihade, “Internal Violence: State’s Role and Society’s Responses,” Arabs Studies 
Quarterly 27, no. 4, (Fall 2005), 37. 
16 Ibid., 37-38. 
17 Laurence Louer, To Be an Arab in Israel (NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 203. 
18 Ibid. 
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believes sufficient progress has been made over the past few years.  While most scholars 
argue that the Jewish majority continues to effectively fractionalize the Arab minority 
both politically and demographically, Louer believes that Israeli Arabs are emerging as a 
major and necessary force in Israeli society.  Furthermore, even though Israeli Arabs 
have never truly unified their twenty percent of electoral votes in the political arena, they 
are still unified in other ways.  “In spite of the competition in which they engage, the 
Arab parties operate as true community institutions, acting in coordination, all of them in 
the last resort maintaining the consensus around Palestinian identity.”19        
Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker describe a new awareness that began to rise within 
Israeli Arab society after the start of the second intifada in October 2000.  In their book, 
Coffins on Our Shoulders, they stress that Palestinian nationalism began to spread 
throughout West Bank and Gaza when Israel took steps at Madrid to “recognize the 
legitimacy of Palestinian national aspirations and the PLO as its representative organ.”20  
Although the PLO was not the representative body of the Palestinians in Israel, the sense 
of Palestinian pride and nationalism still resonated with them.  “Their sense of national 
belonging could now cross geographic, class, and religious lines to form a solid anchor 
for their newly asserted identity.”21  This assessment supports the concept of a new social 
movement among Israel’s Arab population that could possibly emerge in the near future.   
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Social movement theory (SMT) is a basic structural framework used to explain 
the many factors that lead to social mobilization and the case of Israel’s Arab population 
is a prime example.  SMT is a large field of study and an abundance of competing 
arguments have been published regarding the degree of importance that should be given 
to each aspect of the theory.  When large scale social movements began to emerge in the 
eighteenth century, “theorists focused on the three facets of movements that they feared 
                                                 
19 Louer, 94. 
20 Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 114. 
21 Ibid. 
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the most: extremism, deprivation, and violence.”22  As time progressed, there was a 
“civilizing process” within social movements and new characteristics of mobilization 
emerged.23  Tarrow describes the new characteristics as “collective challenge, common 
purpose, social solidarity, and sustained interaction.”24  Similarly, Tilly lists “interest, 
organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself” as the main components 
of collective action.25  SMT scholars generally agree on the necessary factors for social 
mobilization, but their opinions vary on which factors are the most important.  For example, 
Tarrow and McAdam lean toward political opportunity as the key component of mobilization 
while Kurzman stresses the necessity of mobilizing structures or “organizational resources - 
physical, financial, and human – [that easily transfer] to social movement activities.”26  There 
are also contrasting arguments concerning who is most likely to participate in collective 
action.  Passy and Giugni argue that social networks are highly significant for the likelihood 
of individual participation27 but Finkel and Opp counter that incentives within political 
parties are the major driving factor.28  Additionally, McAdam and Paulsen focus on the 
importance of individual identification with the social movement organization in order to 
move from a supporter to an activist.29  The scholars mentioned above have used case studies 
such as political participation in Germany30 and the U.S. Civil Rights movement31 to explain 
the dominance or validity of one aspect of SMT over another.  Few, if any, of the case 
                                                 
22 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4. 
23 Tarrow, 4. 
24 Ibid., 5. 
25 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 7. 
26 Charles Kurzman, “Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A 
Comparative Analysis of Four Religious Movements,” Mobilization: An International Journal 3, no. 1 
(1998), 27. 
27 Florence Passy and Marco Giugni, “Social Networks and Individual Perceptions: Explaining 
Differential Participation in Social Movements,” Sociological Forum 16, no. 1 (March 2001), 123-153. 
28 Steven E. Finkel and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Party Identification and Participation in Collective Political 
Action,” The Journal of Politics 53, no. 2 (May 1991), 366. 
29 Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and 
Activism,” The American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 3 (November 1993), 663. 
30 Steven Finkel and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Party Identification and Participation in Collective Political 
Action,” The Journal of Politics 53, no. 2 (May 1991), 339-371. 
31 Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and 
Activism,” The American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 3 (November 1993), 640-667. 
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studies have truly represented a “perfect storm” or the definitive example of all factors of 
SMT coming together with equal importance in order to achieve social mobilization.  The 
current situation in Israel is an example of an emerging social movement that is equally 
dependent on mobilizing structures, opportunities, and frames in order to succeed.         
For the purpose of analyzing Israeli Arab society, this paper will focus on the 
three main characteristics of SMT: mobilizing structures, political opportunities, and 
framing processes.  The unique aspect within the state of Israel is the lack of compromise 
displayed by the majority of the Jewish population which creates an all or nothing 
rationale between security and equal rights for the Arab minority.  The declaration of 
Israel as a Jewish state is not historically due to racism against Arabs, but Jewish attempts 
to maintain the title within a modern democratic framework are clearly biased.  
Regardless of this observation, the Israeli government and the Jewish majority have 
displayed their dedication to the security of Israel on several occasions, most of which 
were through military force.  Maintaining the Jewish nature of Israel is arguably at the 
same level of importance or at least in the same category as the military defense of its 
borders.  The thought of assimilation with the Arab population and possible loss of 
majority status in Israel is seen as a catastrophic security threat by the Jewish majority.32  
Most social movements face opposition from the state due to a threat posed to the status 
quo.  In contrast, Israeli Arabs face a more determined opposition because, in addition to 
maintaining the status quo, the Jewish majority fears the loss of its own identity and 
survival at the expense of Arab equal rights.  Compromise has become a form of 
weakness in the political realm and government officials risk political suicide for even 
considering negotiations with enemies of the state.  Accordingly, the attempt to stress the 
importance of one factor of SMT over another is pointless because, as this paper will 
argue, all three factors are equally necessary for a social movement to occur in the 
uncompromising state of Israel.   
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II. DISCRIMINATION IN ISRAEL 
The majority of the discrimination against Israeli Arabs stems from the 
declaration of Israel as a “Jewish State” and the attempts by the government to maintain 
the demographic dominance of the Jewish population.  In this context, advancement of 
Arabs within Israeli society, whether in the demographic, economic, political, or 
educational sectors, is viewed as occurring at the expense of the Jewish population and 
could be perceived as a threat to the Jewish nature of Israel.  Additionally, the annual 
celebration of Israel’s proclamation of statehood on May 14, 1948, is a glorious time for 
the Jewish majority, but it also represents the overnight transformation of the Arabs from 
a majority to a minority in their own land.   
The establishment of the state of Israel, which the Jewish people celebrate 
as the fulfillment of the dream of generations, is associated in the historic 
memory [of Palestinians] with the most difficult collective trauma of their 
chronology – the “Naqbah.”  Even if nowadays they do not cite it day and 
night, the conception and birth of the state are inextricably linked to a 
polarized confrontation between two national movements that produced a 
protracted, bloody conflict.  The content and symbols of the state, which 
are anchored in law and glorify the [Israeli] victories in this conflict, 
commemorate for the members of the Arab minority their own defeat.  As 
such, it is doubtful whether they have a way to genuinely identify with it.  
Time may heal their pain, but the more their national awareness 
strengthens, the more they will judge the very establishment of the state as 
problematic.33 
Along with constant reminders of their minority status, there are also several laws that 
have placed limits on the Arab minority of Israel, namely the Law of Return in 1950, the 
Nationality Law of 1952, Amendment No. 9 of Section 7A to the Basic Law in 1985, and 
various land allocation policies involving the Jewish National Fund.  These forms of 
legislation laid the foundation for legal discrimination against Israeli Arabs.  The 
rationale behind much of the legislation was to maintain a Jewish majority by restricting  
 
 
                                                 
33 Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 160.  The authors used a direct quote from the final report of the Orr 
Commission in September, 2003.  
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the growth of the Arab minority.  These laws are imposed under the banner of security 
from outside threats, but they also imply a perceived internal demographic threat from 
Arab population.  
A. GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION 
The Law of Return states that any Jew, regardless of origin, can immigrate to 
Israel and become a citizen.34  The law makes no reference to the Arab population or 
Arab immigration which essentially restricts their access into the country.  However, the 
borders of Israel are open year round for Jews because it is a Jewish state.  “The right 
given in the Law of Return to Jews to immigrate to Israel is one of the only cases in 
Israeli legislation in which an overt distinction is made between the rights of Jews and 
non-Jews.  The former are entitled to come into the country and settle there; the latter 
may only enter the country and settle there if they are granted permission to do so under 
the Entrance to Israel Law, 1952.”35 
Israel’s Nationality Law supplements the Law of Return by stating that “those 
who remained in Israel [after] the establishment of the State in 1948…became Israeli 
citizens by residence or by return.”36  The Nationality Law also states the criteria for 
citizenship through naturalization, but the ultimate decision is made by the Minister of 
the Interior which makes it unlikely for an Arab to gain citizenship through this route.37  
Palestinian Arabs who did not flee in fear for their own safety or were able to avoid 
forceful expulsion by the Haganah were able to stay and become Israeli citizens, but the 
borders were otherwise closed to non-Jews.  Those who did flee were essentially 
denationalized or “stripped of [their] nationality and […] rendered stateless.”38  In 1948 
                                                 
34 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Law of Return 5710-1950,” 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law+of+Return+5710-1950.htm, (accessed on 
January 14, 2008). 
35 David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of Arabs in Israel (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), 36. 
36 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Acquisition of Israeli Nationality,” 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/State/Acquisition+of+Israeli+Nationality.htm, (accessed 
on January 14, 2008). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Victor Kattan, “The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians,” Nordic Journal of International 
Law 74, (2005), 71. 
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and 1967, Palestinians fled to the surrounding Arab states, but were refused re-entry into 
their homeland due to Israel’s Nationality Law.   
Before Amendment No. 9 to Section 7A of the Basic Law was passed in 1985, 
section 7A outlined the individuals who were prohibited from applying for candidacy in 
the Knesset. The typical group of existing government officials, the President, military 
officers, state employees, etc., was listed in the terms of exclusion. In 1985, the following 
criteria were added to the exclusionary terms: 
A candidates’ list shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if its 
objects or actions, expressly or by implication, include one of the 
following: 
(1) Negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the 
Jewish people; 
(2) Negation of the democratic character of the State; 
(3) Incitement to racism39 
 
The first bullet that describes Israel “as the state of the Jewish people” was justifiably met 
with outrage by the Arab population. It implied that any Israeli Arab who wanted to apply 
for candidacy in the Knesset had to subordinate himself to his Jewish peers and accept 
their domination of his homeland. The two additional directives that refer to the 
“democratic character of the State” and “incitement of racism” are disturbingly ironic. 
Arab members of the Knesset suggested that the amendment refuse candidacy based on 
“denial of the existence of the state of Israel” without the implication of a state only for 
the Jewish people. Another idea was to change the wording to “state of the Jewish people 
and its Arab citizens,” but that was also denied by the Knesset.40 It is unfortunate that 
Israel’s democratic government still enforces a policy of alienation on its Arab citizens 
who serve in the Knesset. The amendment serves as a constant reminder to Israeli Arabs 
that they will never truly be embraced by the state.  
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B. THE JEWISH NATIONAL FUND 
The Jewish National Fund (JNF) was established at the Fifth Zionist Congress in 
1901 “to be used to build the foundations of a Jewish state.”41  The fund comprised of 
donations from Jews worldwide and was used to purchase land in Palestine and to finance 
various projects related to a future Jewish state.   
In [the] first decade of its existence, land acquisition was not JNF-KKL’s 
only concern; JNF-KKL played a central role in establishing the first 
modern Jewish city Tel Aviv, acquiring land for the first collective 
community (known today as kibbutzim) and first workers’ community.  
JNF-KKL also set up and administered farms, continued its afforestation 
programs, which laid the foundation for JNF-KKL to become the leading 
environmental agency in the land of Israel, and was instrumental in 
founding secondary schools and pioneering higher education an 
impressive record of achievement in a country whose Jewish population at 
the time numbered 85,000.42 
The JNF truly played a large role in the development of Jewish land before the creation 
of Israel, but it wrongfully continued to serve a significant role in state affairs after 1948.  
In fact, the JNF benefitted immensely from the enforcement of discriminatory legislation 
to include the Absentee Property Regulations of 1948 and the creation of the 
Development Authority.  When thousands of Palestinian Arabs fled their land or were 
forced off by Israeli forces at the start of the 1948 war, the Absentee Property 
Regulations essentially placed the Arab property in the hands of the Custodian of 
Absentee Property.   
His function was to protect and preserve absentee property, but he had not 
received the legal right to dispose of it.  In March 1950, the Absentee 
Property Law (which replaced the earlier Absentee Property Regulations) 
enabled the Custodian to sell land to a development authority when such a 
body would be established by the Knesset; any other sale or transfer was 
prohibited.  The Development Authority was indeed established in August 
that year.  The law permitted the Development Authority to sell land only 
to the state, the JNF, a municipal authority, or to an institution for the 
resettlement of landless Arabs.  In September 1953, the Custodian sold all 
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of the property in his possession to the Development Authority.  
According to a review of activities in the Israel Government Yearbook 
(1959: 75), the JNF purchased 2,324,000 dunam [approximately 574,253 
acres] from the Development Authority.43 
The state used numerous methods and created various agencies to acquire land from the 
Arab population, but they were all a way of funneling the property to the JNF.  Once the 
JNF gained possession of expropriated Arab lands, the state was able to deny liability 
because the JNF was a private organization. 
 Another method used by the JNF was the planting of forests on land expropriated 
from Arabs in order to solidify ownership. 
It’s the Jews who during the 1970s began a campaign of “political 
plantings” – planting a forest was an easy way to establish your control 
over land, and a lot of the JNF plantings were carried out with that in 
mind.  So the Arabs would interpret that as a move that threatened further 
expropriation of Arab-owned land, and they would plant olives on their 
own land in response.44   
The JNF website provides a different explanation for the planting of trees in 
Israel. 
JNF has planted more than 240 million trees since 1901 to protect the 
land, green the landscape and preserve vital ecosystems.  Through the 
generosity of donors like you, JNF continues this effort, planting 
seedlings, maintaining forest health, combating desertification, protecting 
watersheds and managing water flow.45 
This message tugs at the heartstrings of many would be donors who have a deep desire to 
preserve the environment in all parts of the world.  The JNF website also advertises its 
current tree planting campaign as a way to “recognize or memorialize family, friends and  
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loved ones.”46  Environmental reasons may provide a valid justification for planting trees 
on land that was formerly owned by Arabs, but discriminatory ulterior motives are also 
evident. 
 The most recent controversy involving the JNF is the Jewish National Fund Bill 
that passed an initial reading in the Knesset by forty-eight votes in July 2007.47  In order 
to understand the bill itself, it is important to address the events that preceded its 
introduction.  The Israel Land Administration was created in 1960 to manage 
approximately ninety-three percent of Israel’s land that was “either the property of the 
state, the Jewish National Fund or the Development Authority.”48  As was mentioned 
previously, the Development Authority basically served as a middleman between the ILA 
and the JNF.  The blatantly anti-Arab land practices were unsuitable for a democratic 
state because government agencies were responsible for the distribution of land that was 
owned by a private Jewish organization.  To remedy the situation, in 2004 the ILA 
decided that “it was no longer willing to compensate the JNF for land that it leased to 
non-Jews.”49  Since land ownership is a tangible form of Jewish dominance in Israel, 
many MKs viewed the selling of JNF land to Arabs as a potential threat.  Their response 
to the ILA decision was the JNF Bill.  The bill basically allows the JNF, which controls 
thirteen percent of Israel’s land, to continue refusing to lease land to non-Jews.  After 
passing the initial reading in the Knesset, the bill was met with harsh criticism by Israeli 
and U.S. media.50  Many proponents of the bill have argued that “JNF’s property is the 
inheritance of the entire Jewish people; its mission is the task of building homes for a 
nation that has no other haven.”51  In contrast, opponents “argue that since the ILA is an 
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official arm of the government it must conduct all tenders, including those of the JNF, on 
the basis of full equality, no matter what the JNF’s century-old charter says about holding 
land for the Jewish people in perpetuity.”52  As long as the ILA claims to represent both 
the state and the JNF, it will continue to stir up controversy over biased land policies. 
The examples of discrimination mentioned above are by no means an extensive 
list of policies and prejudicial practices against Arabs in Israel. There are many reasons 
why the Israeli government feels a need to promote discriminatory behavior. “The issue 
now at stake is nothing less than the Jewish character of the State.  How can Israel 
continue to be a State of the Jews if twenty percent of its population is Arab?”53 The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the fact that Israel is surrounded by Arab states only add 
to Jewish fears. Paradoxically, the unequal practices used to maintain the status quo in 
Israel may cause the Israeli Arab population to mobilize and absorb the collective identity 
of Palestinians in exile and in the occupied territories instead of an identity as Israeli 
citizens. Israel has every right to secure its borders and to identify valid threats, but 
failing to accept its own Arab minority as equal citizens will create internal opposition to 
the state that was formerly non-existent.  Many of the biased laws in the Jewish state are 
based on principles that were arguably necessary during the first years of Israel’s 
creation.  Jewish paranoia was extremely high due to the offensive nature of the 
surrounding Arab states so legislation that placed physical security above democratic 
principles was seen as justifiable.  As time progresses and Israel struggles to maintain its 
democratic nature, its Jewish majority will eventually need to accept that many of the 
state’s biased laws are outdated and detrimental to the future of the country.  The efforts 
to maintain the Jewishness of Israel at the expense of its democratic nature will ultimately 





                                                 
52 Susser, 11. 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 19
III. OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOBILIZATION 
Since the creation of Israel in 1948, its Arab citizens have remained politically 
passive despite its grievances against the state.  Although there is a history of violent 
demonstrations among the Palestinians in the occupied territories, the Israeli security 
forces have dealt with a minimal amount of internal protests by Arab Israelis. Indeed, 
mobilization is not achieved through grievances alone which makes it a rare and difficult 
phenomenon.  Tilly expressed the common difficulties of social mobilization by saying 
“people vary continuously from intensive involvement to passive compliance, interests 
vary from quite individual to nearly universal.”54  Abundant dissent is only one of several 
factors that are necessary for social mobilization. During the first intifada, Israeli Arabs 
and Palestinians outside of Israel shared common grievances against the Jewish state. 
Military occupation and the encroachment of Jewish settlements onto Arab lands were 
only a few of those grievances.55 However, the proper mobilizing structures and frames 
were never in place and the result was a weak foundation for collective action. This 
section will discuss the differences between the two intifadas and explain the factors that 
resulted in quiet opposition during the first uprising compared to violent protests in the 
second.  
The outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000 marked a turning point in 
the passive mentality of Israel’s Arab minority. The sequence of events was started when 
Ariel Sharon, surrounded by armed bodyguards, visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-
Sharif in Jerusalem on September 28, 2000.56 Massive demonstrations broke out both in 
Israel and the occupied territories that resulted in over a dozen Israeli Arab citizens killed 
by Israeli police and security forces. While Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sharif was the 
incident that sparked the riots, there were many underlying tensions that led up to the 
protests. Some of the more commonly cited motivations were: 
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(1) The racial discrimination to which Arabs have been subjected; (2) 
disappointment in Ehud Barak’s government; (3) the religious dimension 
of the al-Aqsa issue; (4) the Arab national dimension and empathy with 
the Palestinians of the occupied territories; and (5) the mounting anger at 
the Israeli police and their habitual practices against Arab citizens.57 
 
These explanations by former MK Azmi Bishara are valid, but they beg the question of 
why the Israeli Arabs failed to play a significant role in the first intifada?  Between 1948 
and the first intifada in 1987, the above explanations were applicable in everyday Israeli 
Arab life except for the disappointment with Ehud Barak’s government and the al-Aqsa 
issue. Immediately after the first intifada, one Israeli Arab explained the difference 
between Palestinians inside Israel versus those outside by saying “there is a difference 
between players and fans. We are fans. Our goal is to live in Israel with equal rights, 
while the aim of the residents in the West Bank is to form a separate state.”58 In other 
words, the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza was worthy of Israeli Arab 
support as long as direct involvement was not necessary. Despite the loyalty that Israeli 
Arabs gave to the political process, they were not accepted as equals by the Jewish 
majority. The Israeli government continued to show the same amount of distrust toward 
Israeli Arabs as it did toward Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories. This became a 
contributing factor to the tensions that would lead to the second intifada when the Arabs 
inside and outside of Israel came as close as they ever would to collective action. 
Another explanation for the Israeli Arab participation in the second intifada is the 
relative exclusion of Arabs from the political decision-making process after the victory of 
the Labor Party in 1999. The Arab community embraced the political process and was 
swayed by the slogan “The State for All” of the Labor Party.59 The words were obviously 
aimed at the Arab population who sought equality as Israeli citizens. However, once 
Prime Minister Barak was in power, the Arabs were bitterly disappointed when a 
majority of the campaign promises went unfulfilled. Louer argues that the bitterness from 
the 1999 elections was still fresh in the minds of most Israeli Arabs when the intifada 
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began a year later. After watching Israeli security forces use live ammunition against 
Arab demonstrators at the al-Aqsa mosque, the Arab population gave up on the political 
process and met violence with more violence.60 The violence transitioned to Arab unity 
at the polls in the form of a boycott during the February 2001 elections for prime 
minister. The importance of the Arab vote was solidified when the Labor Party eventually 
lost most of its political power to Likud. Since the boycott, the percentage of Arabs who 
take part in elections has gradually declined which sends signals of hopelessness in the 
political process. Yiftachel adds that “the chasm between Jewish and Arab political space 
has thus widened significantly in the recent past, seriously shrinking the ability of 
Palestinian Arab citizens to mobilize within the confines of Jewish tolerance and Israeli 
law.”61 If this is true, Israeli Arabs may eventually see violence as their only alternative.  
An additional aspect of the second intifada is the structure and organization of the 
Palestinians during their protests. One of the most obvious differences between the two 
intifadas is the preponderance of violence in the second one. The Israeli Arab struggle for 
equal rights was consistently overshadowed by the violence in the occupied territories. 
This is largely due to a fractionalization in the leadership of the Palestinian people which 
resulted in a lack of clear goals for the movement. Almost two years after the start of the 
second intifada, a large group of Palestinian scholars and public figures signed a petition 
in order to curb the reliance on senseless violence against Israeli civilians. They had seen 
the effectiveness of peaceful protests during the first intifada and wanted to steer the 
second intifada in the same direction. In reference to suicide bombings, the “Petition of 
the 55” stated “we see that these bombings do not contribute towards achieving our 
national project which calls for freedom and independence. On the contrary, they 
strengthen the enemies of peace on the Israeli side…”62 There were two main factors that 
doomed the petition to failure: it was sponsored by the European Union and many of the 
Israeli Arabs who signed it lacked legitimacy in the resistance. Also, the western 
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sponsorship of the petition tainted its validity in the eyes of many Palestinians and the 
signatories were believed to have ulterior motives. In reference to the signatories, a 
student leader in the PFLP commented that “those are the people whose interests are 
connected with the existence of the occupation. During peacetime, they are living a good 
life and working well, but when there is resistance, it works against their interests, they 
gain nothing.”63 The failure of the petition to gain public support demonstrated the divide 
between the educated Palestinian elites and the rest of Palestinian society both inside and 
outside of Israel. This divide resulted in unorganized protests that quickly turned violent 
and gave the Israeli defense forces an excuse for massive retaliation.  
Despite the initial violent displays of collective action by Israeli Arabs that 
marked the start of the second intifada, the uprising eventually became isolated in the 
occupied territories. The 2000 uprising was far more violent than the first intifada in 
1987, but the Arabs in Israel continued to play a minor role in relation to Palestinians 
outside Israel’s borders. If anything, the violence by the Israeli Arabs was a show of 
frustration for several built up grievances, but not necessarily grievances shared by 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. Once the Israeli Arabs lashed out in anger and 
made their objections known to Israeli society, they returned to non-violent measures to 
challenge the state. Many reverted to political parties and religious movements while 
most used the boycott of elections as a show of political unity. Any resemblance of Arab 
mobilization within Israel was through a political means. The result was, and continues to 
be, an ineffective movement that is easily controlled within the boundaries of the political 
process.  
Apt and resonating frames are necessary for a movement to create a shared 
identity among its members and to gain empathy for its cause. “Palestinian nationalism” 
is a common term among Israel’s Arab population, but the implications of its meaning 
are either misunderstood or wrongfully applied by Arab elites. According to Snyder, 
nationalism is “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, 
history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that 
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expresses and protects these distinctive characteristics.”64 Therefore, it would be fair to 
say that Palestinian nationalism entails a unified desire for the creation of a sovereign 
Palestinian state where its people share a similar history, culture, and representative 
institutions. In contrast, Israeli Arabs are seeking equal rights, education, and economic 
opportunities as citizens of Israel. Additionally, a large majority of Israeli Arabs would 
choose to stay in Israel if a Palestinian state was formed in the future.65 The attempts of 
Israeli Arabs to identify with Palestinian nationalism in order to further their own 
unrelated struggle against Israel has been ineffective in the past, but the proper framing of 
the movement could give it new life.  
A cost-benefit analysis of the second intifada shows that Palestinian Israelis did 
not find it in their best interest to continue the violence in the same fashion as their 
Palestinian brethren in the occupied territories. Many authors have argued that Israeli 
Arabs initially resorted to violence due to a lack of political representation. However, the 
motivation that was necessary for sustained violent collective action did not exist among 
Israel’s Arab population. As long as Israeli Arabs continue to enjoy a better lifestyle and 
comparatively more rights than Palestinians in the occupied territories, they will show 
great reluctance to truly identify with the Palestinian national cause. The Palestinian 
identity and the Palestinian cause of a sovereign state go hand in hand, but Israeli Arab 
leaders are trying to separate the two in order to use the Palestinian identity for their own 
political grievances. Meanwhile, the benefits of maintaining a relatively positive, yet 
discriminatory relationship with the Israeli state greatly outweigh the risks of collective 
action. 
…citizenship played a fundamental role in the molding of the Arab 
citizens into a community. This was a consideration all the more important 
when, on the one hand, any mobilization was liable to be the object of 
police repression, while on the other, the Arab citizens were able to 
exercise from within a degree of influence on the political decision-
making process. It is precisely because they enjoyed voting rights, within  
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a system in which more than elsewhere politics is the pre-eminent sphere 
of decision-making and influence, that the Arabs made a position for 
themselves within the political process.66 
Based on this observation, the Israeli Arab leaders might find more success by embracing 
their identities as Arab citizens of Israel with unequal rights rather than with the 
Palestinian cause of a sovereign state. A valid reason for the reassessment of identities is 
that the title of “Palestinian” has been reinforced with its own frames since the beginning 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli Jews are more prone to gather connotations of 
terrorism or violence at the mention of the term “Palestinian.” When the Arab population 
in Israel chooses to label itself with a Palestinian identity, the Israeli government and the 
Jewish majority react with suspicion and distrust.67 In the minds of the Jewish 
population, it also justifies feelings of discrimination and inequality because it sees the 
Palestinians as a security threat. Also, “the state of Israel has historically avoided the term 
“Palestinian” because of the implied recognition of the existence of such a national group 
and its rights.”68 Arabs who embrace their identity as Israeli Arab citizens might not stir 
up the same emotional undertones brought on by the title of “Palestinian.” This would 
allow them to further their cause for equal rights as Israeli citizens without bringing up 
the negative connotations that are common with the Palestinian identity in Israel.  
Lastly, while many Israeli Arabs may embrace Palestinian nationalism, they are 
not officially represented by Palestinian organizations such as the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization or the Palestinian Authority. This was a result of Yasir Arafat’s signing of 
the Oslo Accords in 1993.69 Therefore, the only time when Palestinians in Israel or the 
occupied territories identify with one another is when it is in their own respective best 
interests. If given the choice between the struggle for equal rights through Israeli  
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citizenship or the Palestinian cause of an end to Israeli occupation and a sovereign state, 
Arab Israelis should not have a problem making a decision based on their own best 
interests.  
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Despite consistent discrimination by the Jewish majority, the Israeli Arab pattern 
of protest is inconsistent at best and it is difficult to pinpoint vital factors that could ignite 
future collective action. The dominant trend is that protests by Arabs in Israel have 
increased in number and intensity since 1975, but the entire community seldom unites 
under a common identity.70 There are several theories on conflict and protest that provide 
further insight into situations similar to Israel’s, but the most applicable theory for the 
Arab Israelis is Social Movement Theory (SMT). SMT scholars that include Tilly, 
McAdam, and Tarrow stress three necessary factors of “political opportunities, 
mobilizing structures, and framing processes” for collective action to occur.71 Political 
opportunities asserts “that social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader 
set of political constraints and opportunities” within their respective countries.72 
Mobilizing structures refers to the necessary “collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”73 Framing 
processes are the development of “shared meanings and definitions that people bring to 
their situation.”74 This section addresses historical events in Israeli Arab society that 
include forms of the three factors above in order to determine the probability for future 
collective action. Israel has successfully used co-optation to create political opportunities 
for segments of its Arab population that has in turn reduced their ability to build strong 
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mobilizing structures. Two significant events are used to exemplify this point: the Zionist 
co-optation of the Arab Druze population through military conscription and the voluntary 
service of Palestinian Arabs in the IDF. The second intifada is then used to explain how 
proper framing processes began to create a more organized and definable Israeli Arab 
identity.  
After almost sixty years of living within the state of Israel, the Arab minority is 
still excluded from conscription in the military. However, the Druze population is the one 
exception to the rule because they are no longer labeled as Arabs by the Jewish state. It 
all started when the Israeli army created the “Minorities Unit” in 1948 in order to co-opt 
the Druze population. The new unit provided negligible combat power for the military, 
but it gave the Druze a sense of belonging within Israeli society. In 1949, the Druze were 
recruited for the Israeli police forces as well.75 The integration of the Druze into the 
Jewish state was part of a calculated plan by the Israeli government to divide and control 
the overall Arab minority. “The policy aimed at weaning them away from the larger 
Palestinian Arab community by fostering ‘Druze particularism,’ the notion that Druze 
ethnicity and identity make them distinct from other Arabs.”76  The Druze chose to 
identify with their religion instead of their Arab ethnicity because, in return, they were 
guaranteed a higher status in Israeli society. The Israeli government went to great lengths 
to ensure that an entirely new identity was created for the Druze separate from their 
former Arab identity. Furthermore, the willingness of the Druze elite to accept the offer 
of co-optation forever alienated their people from the rest of the Arab minority. 
Shaykh Jaber Mu’addi was one of the first collaborators to approach the Zionist 
movement in 1948 due to his political aspirations and a desire for increased status in the 
Druze community.77 He rallied support among the Druzes for “the obligatory 
conscription law of May 1956” which basically made it mandatory for Druzes to serve in 
the military once they turned eighteen years of age.78 Once the act was passed, it was met 
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with massive objection by the Druze community, but the law is still in affect today. The 
Druze community did not always welcome the actions of the Druze elites, but the 
community still partook in the benefits that arose from the co-optation. Advantages of 
their new identity included a better education system, more job opportunities, and higher 
class status.79 The change in identity that the Druzes went through in order to increase 
their opportunities within Israel was irreversible and their split from the rest of the Arab 
Israeli population was a constant reminder of the government’s attempt to prevent the 
Arab minority from forming a cohesive unit. As many SMT scholars would argue, the 
Druzes changed their identity because it improved their situation. However, recent events 
show that the dissent of the Druze population toward the state is reaching a boiling point. 
Although the state formed the relationship with the Druze long ago, the alliance has been 
weakened by continued discrimination, Jewish settlement expansion into Druze territory, 
and police brutality in the Druze village of Peki’in.80 If this trend continues, the Druze 
might seek other opportunities based on a united Arab identity with the Palestinians. 
Whether or not the Palestinians choose to include them is another story. 
While the Druze population was co-opted through military conscription, there are 
also thousands of Palestinians in Israel who have voluntarily joined the army and security 
forces as well. There is limited research on this unique group of Palestinians in Israel, but 
Kanaaneh states that “an estimated 5,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel currently volunteer 
to serve in the Israeli military.”81 The topic is virtually untouched by Jewish Israeli 
scholars as Kanaaneh implies in her work. Upon asking a Jewish Israeli academic for 
assistance on the subject of Palestinians serving in the Israeli military, Kanaaneh received 
the following reply: 
I don’t know what…you’re talking [about]. Except [for] about a 
dozen…volunteers no Palestinians serv[e] in the Israeli military. Druze 
and Circassians are drafted and several hundreds of Bedouins (and perhaps 
some Arab Christians) serv[e] as volunteers. However [to the best of my] 
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knowledge none of them perceived themselves as ‘Palestinian.’ If you’re 
searching for ARABS in the Israeli military, this is another issue.82 
The difference between declaring oneself Palestinian or Arab is a choice of identity, to 
join the collective identity of Palestinians elsewhere or to remain distinct. A Palestinian 
serving in the Israeli army may effortlessly change his identity several times a day. 
To be honest with you “How do you identify yourself?” is not a good 
question – it depends on where I am. If I am at the tax office or in the 
[Jewish] Mall I’m not going to go around shouting, “Hey, look at me, I’m 
a Palestinian.” I’m not stupid. There, I identify myself as an Israeli Arab. 
If you ask me here in my village among the people of the village, I’ll tell 
you I’m a Palestinian Arab. Everybody tailors his answer to the situation 
he is in. This is the reality.83 
These Arab citizens walk a fine line by joining the institution that has become a symbol 
of repression to Palestinian Arabs inside and outside of Israel. However, many of them 
believe the benefits of voluntary military service outweigh the costs, so they embrace 
their multiple identities. This phenomenon is not unique to Palestinians in Israel because 
people around the world do the same thing every day in their jobs, social groups, and 
religious gatherings. The ability of Palestinian Arabs to voluntarily change identities 
based on various circumstances is detrimental to the overall effort of collective 
mobilization. A unified uprising against the Israeli state by its own Arab citizens is an 
option that would require the recognition of one identity regardless of the impending 
hardship that it might entail. At this point, the majority of Arab Israelis embrace various 
identities that will improve their situation in the short term, but this prevents them from 
mobilizing under one common identity to force positive long term changes.  
The second intifada in 2000 marked a rare period when Palestinian Arab citizens 
in Israel joined Palestinians in the occupied territories in violent protest. It also solidified 
a new regional Palestinian identity that was separate from Palestinian nationalism in the 
occupied territories. After over fifty years of living inside Israel, the Arab population 
finally began to realize the importance of framing their own situation as separate from the 
nationalistic Palestinian identity in Gaza and the West Bank. In 1997, Yiftachel 
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conducted a study on Arab protest in the Galilee and found that “the emergence of a 
regional Palestinian identity in Israel and in the Galilee is still in its infancy but the 
process has the potential to influence the relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel 
during the critical years to come.”84 The second intifada was the culmination of several 
repressed Arab grievances against the Jewish state, but it also served as a maturation 
period for the regional Palestinian identity. The Palestinian and Israeli Arab identities 
shared a common culture and background, but their objectives were different. Ashkenasi 
hints that during the first intifada, “socioeconomic concerns of Arabs within Israel may 
have more to do with self-identification than with the intifada.”85 However, at that point 
the Israeli Arabs were still caught between the national Palestinian cause and their own 
regional issues. The emerging regional Palestinian identity was still in its initial stage, but 
it was developing and gaining legitimacy among the Arab population. At the advent of 
the second intifada, the major concerns of Israeli Arabs were equal rights and fair 
treatment within the Jewish state and the uprising provided an outlet for their dissent. By 
framing their own struggle around the intifada in the occupied territories, the Israeli 
Arabs were able to capitalize on the Palestinian identity to rally support for their own 
cause. The increase in violent protest during the second intifada demonstrated that the 
new identity within Israel was gaining statewide momentum.  Developments after 2001 
have shown that a new generation of Arabs is now shaping the regional Palestinian 
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IV. THE STAND-TALL GENERATION 
 Despite their brief uprising against the state, the situation of the Arab minority in 
Israel has not improved since the second intifada began in October 2000.  It is evident 
that political solutions will continue to provide little to no progress since anti-
discriminatory legislation is passed in the Knesset, but seldom enforced on the local 
level.  For example, the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty from 1994 states that 
“all persons are entitled to protection of their life, body, and dignity” and “no search shall 
be conducted on the private premises of a person, nor in the body or personal effects.”86  
Like most of Israel’s basic laws, the Human Dignity Law purposely leaves much room 
for interpretation.  Using discriminatory practices against Arabs as evidence, the 
definition of “dignity” that is upheld by the state would vary between Jews and non-Jews.  
Also, the rights of Arabs are quickly tossed aside once the state brings national security to 
the forefront.  Similar discrepancies are abundant in recent Israeli legislation, but that has 
been addressed in previous chapters.  Fortunately for the Arab minority, there are still 
available methods for forging ahead in the struggle for equality.         
Education has a way of providing a new perspective on an old situation.  A few 
words used to describe the Israeli Arabs two generations ago were weak, easily 
dominated, uneducated, and unorganized.87  In contrast, the emerging generation of 
Arabs in Israel has found that education opened their eyes to the world around them.  
“[The Stand-Tall Generation’s] representatives and leaders, many of them women, 
display a new assertive voice, abrasive style, and unequivocal substantive clarity.  They 
have unmitigated determination, confidence, and a sense of entitlement the likes of which 
had only seldom been articulated previously by Palestinians addressing the Israeli 
mainstream.”88  This new generation is aware of the wrongs that are committed against 
Arab society on a daily basis and they are more capable to do something about it than any 
generation before them.  “Widespread literacy, access to higher education and 
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professional mobility of the elites, as well as access to the media, are all factors which 
would have progressively allowed the Arab citizens to become aware of the policies of 
domination to which they have been subjected, and to organize themselves collectively 
with a view to take counter action.”89  In order to create the environment for a 
burgeoning social movement to thrive in Israel, it is necessary to utilize proper framing 
processes, mobilizing structures, and political opportunities.  In this chapter, social 
movement theory will be applied to the Israeli Arab situation that arose after the initial 
events of the second intifada in 2000.  Apt and resonating frames and counterframes have 
been employed by the Arab population and the state through Israelization and 
Palestinization to form respective identities within Israeli society.  Meanwhile, 
established organizations like Adalah and the Islamic Movement along with emerging 
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir are potential mobilizing structures that could gain massive 
support if utilized properly.  This chapter will conclude by addressing various political 
opportunities that have emerged in recent years to include Arab election boycotts and 
anti-Arab rhetoric that has become common among Jewish government officials. 
A. EFFECTIVE FRAMES 
 Israelization and Palestinization are two examples of framing processes that are at 
work within the Israeli Arab community.  Israelization refers to “the extent to which 
[Israeli Arabs] have internalized the Israeli world view” as well as “their degree of 
acceptance of the established order.”90  Another definition given by Dan Rabinowitz is 
the attempt by the Jewish state “to control the [Arab] community’s intellectual energy 
and political awareness in a futile effort to cultivate docile, depoliticized, submissive 
subjects.91  In contrast, Palestinization is the degree to which Israeli Arabs embrace the 
Palestinian national struggle that is a reality in the occupied territories.  The Jewish 
majority believed that greater education for Arabs in Israeli universities along with 
immersion in Israeli society would assist in the creation of a pro-Israel worldview among 
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the Arab minority.  The result has been twofold: some educated Arabs have become 
immersed in Israeli society and accept the social order while others have gained a new 
awareness of the discriminatory practices against them.   
 Israelization has been an effective state tool with a portion of the Arab minority 
due to the influence of western modernism and secularism, not norms and values that are 
exclusive only to Israeli society.  Many Arab youth grow up in a sheltered village 
environment where Muslim parents shield them from the temptations of secularism.  
Once they travel away from home and attend university, the Islamic moral boundaries 
grow thin and they are able to experience new and fascinating things that were never 
dreamed of in their villages.  Taboo practices that Arab college students are able to 
engage in range from late night partying to sexual exploration.92  Furthermore, other 
Arabs embrace the Israeli identity as more than just a means of experimentation.  “A 
significant number of [the Stand-Tall Generation’s] members have been socialized in the 
apolitical manner intended by the state and administered through its formal education 
system…individuals with a barren sensibility have emerged, fearful of political 
involvement, merely seeking ‘to get along’ and find safe havens in the middle ground.”93  
These individuals tend to see traditional Arab society as a world that is stuck in the past 
and Israeli society as the path to the future.  Despite their newfound beliefs, those who 
graduate from an Israeli university and then decide not to get involved in the struggle for 
equal rights are a vital group among Israeli Arabs.  They are the ones who must be 
convinced of the benefits of collective action in order to achieve unity among the Stand-
Tall Generation.    
Arab dissent is increasing within Israel as more educated Arabs are capable of 
using proper outlets and staging protests in order to speak out against the state.  Although 
the outspoken Arabs are a product of both Israelization and Palestinization, the Israeli 
government labels many of them as militant due to their pro-Palestinian stance. 
An observation yet more significant concerning the idea of the 
‘conciliatory’ quality of Israelisation, which at the same time hints its 
limitations, is the view held by certain Jewish opinion-formers regarding 
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the figures who head the Arab political scene in Israel today.  The 
prevailing rhetoric, which castigates without hesitation the militancy of the 
Arab Knesset members, overlooks rather too readily that fulsome praise 
has in the past been heaped on a number of them, on whom high hopes 
were once placed, precisely because they were highly ‘Israelised’.  This 
was particularly so with Azmi Bishara, who was at one time seen as the 
bridge capable of uniting Arabs and Israelis…94 
        
Once Bishara’s Israelization began to take on a new form of Palestinization, his once 
supportive peers in the Knesset were quick to turn against him.  He recently fled to Egypt 
in April of 2007 after allegations of collaborating with Hezbollah surfaced against him.95  
Bishara’s case is more severe than most, but examples of Israelization working against 
the state are abundant throughout Israel.  Other Palestinians have volunteered for the 
Israeli Defense Forces, the ultimate form of Israelization, in order to legitimate future 
claims of discrimination.96  Arab Student Unions (ASUs) are also a common counter-
Israelization tool within Israeli universities.  “[They] convey to the students their 
obligation as the educated class to identify with and further national pride and 
awareness.”97  An educated Arab minority is a double edged sword for the state because 
although the benefits of modernization are displayed to the younger generation, they also 
become trained to think analytically which pushes them toward Palestinization.  In a way, 
Palestinization would not be as possible on a large scale if it was not for Israelization.  
“[A]cculturation is at one and the same time the necessary condition for the possibility of 
counter-acculturation, since the counter-acculturation is a necessary dialectical movement 
emerging from any process of reversal of the definitions of self imposed by the dominant 
culture.”98  The struggle of the Palestinians outside of Israel is a difficult topic for Israeli  
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Arabs to ignore regardless of their own higher standard of living.  Even those who 
embrace an Israeli identity must willingly overlook the discriminatory environment 
around them or rationalize it.        
 There are many powerful frames that are at work in Israel and its definition as a 
Jewish state is perhaps the most powerful, yet detrimental, frame of all.  It clearly states 
who can identify with the nation as well as who will never identify with it.  New Jewish 
citizens entering the country through Ben-Gurion International Airport are greeted with 
immediate frames of belonging once badges are pinned to their chests that read “I’ve 
come home.”99  The same greeting is not reserved for Arab citizens.  “An Arab’s status 
as a citizen inside the Jewish state is immediately made clear the moment he enters the 
airport and produces his passport for inspection by one of the young Jewish officials who 
are charged with assessing the security threat posed by each passenger.  The main 
criterion use by security personnel is not whether the traveler is an Israeli or a non-Israeli 
but a Jew or non-Jew.”100  The Arab minority has never really developed any effective 
counter-frames that resonate with all non-Jews in the country.  This inability to counter 
the Jewish majority essentially creates the pitiful identity of cowering victims in their 
own homeland.   
Membership in a nation is a constitutive factor of personal identity.  The 
self-image of individuals is highly affected by the status of their national 
community.  The ability of individuals to lead a satisfying life and to attain 
the respect of others is contingent on, although not assured by, the ability 
to view themselves as active members of a worthy community.  A safe, 
dignified and flourishing national existence thus significantly contributes 
to their well-being.101 
Effective frames in Israeli society, regardless of the audience, most commonly take the 
form of slogans that effectively widen the gap between Arabs and Jews.  Popular Jewish 
slogans in the past have dealt with matters ranging from population transfer (“Jordan is 
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Palestine”102) to Zionism (“a land without people for a people without land”103).  Israeli 
Arabs have created slogans and symbols to gain support, but they are usually based on a 
similar overarching movement that is not unique to their own situation.  “Islam is the 
Answer” was a popular slogan for the Islamic Movement in Israel’s 1989 elections, but it 
was a catchphrase that was floating around the entire Muslim world at the time.104  In the 
same fashion, prime minister candidate Ehud Barak used the slogan “A State for All” in 
order to effectively entice Arab voters toward his Labor party in 1999 only to turn his 
back on them once he was elected.105  Based on these examples, various framing 
techniques have resonated with the Arab population even when they were misguided or 
insincere.               
Since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, several factors have emerged 
that will continue to draw the Arab population closer to collective action.  In some cases, 
Arab elites methodically stage protests against the state and in other cases, the protests 
seem to spontaneously erupt due to overwhelming Arab dissent.  The protests are usually 
local events that never result in collective action, but they are signs that Israeli Arabs are 
becoming more vocal against the state.  In terms of mobilization, Arabs in Israel seem to 
wait for Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza to take the lead.  Even then, their likelihood 
of taking part in the collective action depends on their own political situation at the time.  
The most effective frames used for mobilization have come out of the occupied territories 
due to the greater sense of urgency that emanates from the Israeli occupation.  The new 
Stand-Tall generation in Israel has grown up surrounded by both effective and ineffective 
frames which should make them capable of creating symbols and slogans that resonate 
with the Arab minority.  If not, they will surely wait for their brethren in Gaza and the 
West Bank to do it for them.    
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B. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
According to McCarthy, mobilizing structures are “those agreed upon ways of 
engaging in collective action which include particular ‘tactical repertoires,’ particular 
‘social movement organizational’ forms, and ‘modular social movement repertoires.’”106  
In terms of Israeli Arabs, the extensive list of potential mobilizing structures includes 
village councils, non-governmental organizations, student unions, political groups, etc.,.  
Kriesi explains the importance of four different types of mobilizing structures that exist 
within social movements.  Social Movement Organizations (SMOs), “supportive 
organizations,” “movement associations,” and “parties and interest groups” are vital 
facets to collective action, but only SMOs require direct involvement by a 
constituency.107  While the other groups are still necessary for a successful movement, 
they consist of “friendly media, churches, restaurants, print shops, or educational 
institutions, which contribute to the social organization of the constituency of a given 
movement without directly taking part in the mobilization for collective action.”108  
Israeli Arabs tend to follow a similar pattern of showing support for collective action 
without getting directly involved.  The second intifada was an exception to the norm, but 
they quickly fell back into their comfort zone after the initial protests were over.  A 
majority of the Arab population will have to get their hands dirty in order to give 
mobilizing structures enough support to create long term change.  Many groups lie on the 
fringe of moving from support to direct involvement, but they need the right opportunity 
to make the transition. 
One of the more important groups that would fall under the banner of a supportive 
organization is the student union, and more specifically, the Arab Student Union (ASU).  
The emergence of the Stand-Tall generation is partially due to the unrecognized ASUs in 
Israeli universities. 
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From its inception, the ASU has espoused a declared aim to identify with 
national issues both inside and outside of Israel.  The ASU provides a full 
cultural life for students.  Often even before they arrive on campus, 
students are contacted by the ASU.  Contact continues through the 
delivery of information sheets on the political situation, newspapers, 
posters with national slogans and pictures, and notices of activities sent to 
dorm rooms.[…]At universities in Israel in which most Palestinian 
students live away from home and board in the dormitories, this subset is 
brought together as a packaged audience.  The ASU plays an active role in 
tapping into this resource and instructing in-gathered students into a new 
identity and role.109    
The ASU plays a large role in mobilizing Arab students for political matters which 
influences their willingness for political participation after college graduation.  Not all 
Arab university students are members of an ASU, but “all current major Palestinian-
Israeli political figures were once active in the ASU.”110  Leaflets passed out by ASU 
connected students have recently been the focus of controversy at Haifa University.  
Students passed out fliers calling for the Arab reoccupation of Jerusalem, but the papers 
were quickly confiscated by campus security since the university had not pre-approved 
the message.111  MK Alex Miller responded to the incident by saying, “The students 
distributing this material are guilty of incitement and are not worthy to be neither the 
university’s students nor citizens of Israel.  I intend to demand President Shimon Peres’ 
involvement in denouncing the leaflets’ writers and distributors.”112  A similar situation 
occurred in January 2007 when Jewish residents of B’nei Brak, a town on the outskirts of 
Tel Aviv, passed out fliers banning the rental of rooms to Arab university students.  
Despite Arab attempts to pursue a criminal investigation, nothing was done to remedy the 
situation.113  The fliers passed out by Haifa University students were not the most well 
thought out ideal, but they were harmless compared to the direct discrimination of the  
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B’nei Brak residents.  Given the proper political opportunity along with effective frames, 
the ASUs in Israel could serve as a vital mobilizing structure to exploit such blatant 
double standards. 
 Palestinian Israeli non-governmental organizations (PINGOs) are another 
mobilizing structure within Israeli Arab society.  Groups like Adalah, The Arab 
Association for Human Rights (HRA), and the Mossawa Center strive to gain Arab equal 
rights through the legal process.  Upon graduation, many university students who were 
members of the ASU become involved in one of the numerous Palestinian NGOs.  Since 
the Israeli government’s main purpose is to represent the Jewish interests of the state, the 
NGOs become the most efficient forum for Arab voices to be heard and then relayed to 
the state.114  The websites for these organizations are filled with constant news and 
updates concerning the struggle for Arab equal rights in Israel.  Adalah, which means 
“justice” in Arabic, publishes an annual report of its activities in order to gain more 
support and to show Arab citizens any progress that has been made on pertinent issues.  
In 2007, the organization produced a “Democratic Constitution” since the Israeli 
government has never formally drafted a constitution.  Adalah’s version “respects the 
freedoms of the individual and the rights of all groups in equal measure, gives proper 
weight to the historical injustices committed against Arab citizens of Israel, and deals 
seriously with the social and economic rights of all.”115  Although the Israeli government 
would never truly consider the constitution, it still serves as evidence that the Arab 
minority is not happy with the current ethnocentric government and that it is willing to 
engage in civil discussions to make positive changes.  The HRA and the Mossawa Center 
partake in similar ventures as Adalah by exposing discriminatory practices throughout 
Israel and then finding enough support, either nationally or internationally, to force 
government action.  Mossawa has also drafted a constitution to give the Arab public a 
sample of what it hopes to achieve with their support. 
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 The most recent events that have called the PINGOs to action are the Attorney 
General’s decision to drop charges against Israeli police snipers who killed thirteen Arab 
citizens in October 2000116 and the October 2007 events in a Druze village where Israeli 
police used live ammunition on protesters.117  The majority of the NGOs’ work consists 
of awareness campaigns to keep the Arab public informed of unfolding events.  The 
website for the Mossawa Center states that the organization “utilizes various methods, 
including advocacy in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) and government, socio-economic 
research and analysis, public information campaigns, capacity building with a broad 
network of Arab NGOs, and cooperative work with Local Councils as well as Israeli 
based and international NGOs.”118  Most PINGOs mention similar methods in their 
mission statements and the resulting network that is created from the vast array of 
connections serves as an extremely capable mobilizing structure.  Specific projects and 
methods may vary from one NGO to another, but the majority of them share the blanket 
mission of achieving equal rights for Arab citizens of Israel.  While Israel can still pass 
discriminatory legislation and treat Arabs as second class citizens, the legislators know 
that the PINGOs will broadcast the news to the Arab population immediately after it 
happens.  This tactic has not resulted in collective action, but that is not necessarily what 
the NGOs are intending to achieve.  Their main concern is change through the legal and 
political process even though they can also rally many of their networks together as 
structures for mobilization.   
 PINGOs are an important counter balance for the Arab minority against the 
discriminatory policies of the state.  Without them serving as reputable watchdogs, the 
Arab population would have little to rely on besides local councils and a few Arab 
members of the Knesset as representatives.  The jobs and opportunities provided by 
PINGOs are also valuable to both educated and uneducated Arabs.  PINGOs “fill a 
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vacuum by providing needed social services” and “it is telling of the role of PINGOs in 
their community that they employ nearly double the rate of employees as their Jewish 
counterparts.”119  The simple fact that there is a comparable number of NGOs in Israel to 
some developing countries shows that there is a sincere need for them among the Arab 
community; however, besides state enforced restrictions, the basic structure of NGOs 
usually makes them capable of only limited change in their respective societies.  Payes 
states that critics of NGOs argue “the limitation of NGOs are tied to their tendency to 
promote technical rather than political solutions to problems, which reduces pressure on 
the state rather than challenging the roots of inequality, their lack of coordination and 
splintered representation, the fact that they are not elected institutions and hence base 
their legitimacy on state recognition, and their dependency on external donors, who 
sometimes dictate agenda for action.”120  On one hand, the vast networks created by 
NGOs can actually make them disorganized and ineffective if not properly utilized.  On 
the other hand, most of the PINGOs described above strive for the same goal of Arab 
equality in Israel, which means mobilizing their respective networks under a collective 
entity would be possible with the right frames and political opportunities. 
 The last group that has recently shown potential as a mobilizing structure is the 
Islamists.  The Islamic movement and Hizb ut-Tahrir respectively represent one group 
that has been at the forefront of the Israeli Arab political and social scene and another that 
is starting to emerge as the representative for the Palestinian national identity.  The use of 
Islam as a force for social movements is nothing new in the Middle East, but it has been 
kept at bay by the Israeli government.  Being surrounded by Muslim countries only adds 
to the Jewish paranoia that Muslim Arab citizens of Israel could become a potential 
Trojan horse.  Most Islamic organizations in Israel began as basic service providers for 
local communities and then expanded to politics once they acquired a loyal constituency.  
The majority of members do not join due to strong religious beliefs, but because of the 
social services provided.  When asked about her support of the Islamic movement, one 
Israeli Arab woman replied, “People don’t vote for them for religious reasons.  The 
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Islamists have cleaned up the streets and provided services.  End the discrimination and 
you’ll see the end of the support for them.”121  One of the first of Israel’s Islamic 
organizations began in the late 1970s and was called the Society for Piety and 
Benevolence.  Its main purpose at the time “was to fight against the ‘moral decadence’ 
which now in their view typified Arab society in Israel.”122  The organization eventually 
helped to set up schools and furthered the pursuit of organized Islam in Israel.  Several of 
the members of the Society for Piety and Benevolence became sheikhs and eventually 
assisted Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish in setting up the Islamic movement.123  Other 
Islamic organizations and programs that exist in Israel today can be traced back to the 
Society for Piety and Benevolence, but the Islamic movement is one of the most 
prominent.   
 Although the Islamic movement was founded in the early 1980s, it refused 
inclusion in the Israeli political process until 1989 when it was successful in local 
elections within Arab towns and then in 1996 when it officially became a political 
party.124  Before its emergence onto the political scene, the movement focused on 
grassroots projects as it “established schools, clinics, and camps in a number of Arab 
communities, all of which [gave] it legitimacy and generated popular support.”125  The 
organization then split up over a disagreement between the northern and southern factions 
concerning political participation.  The southern Islamic movement decided to join the 
political process while the northern faction, led by Sheikh Raed Salah, boycotted national 
elections and remained at the municipal level.  In the 1996 elections, the southern Islamic 
movement had a large enough constituency to win two seats in the Knesset.126  The 
Islamic movement continues to achieve limited success in Israeli national elections which 
leads many Israeli Arabs to believe that the Jewish dominated government is giving them 
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just enough political inclusion to keep them content without actually granting any 
significant power.127  Islamic institutions that focus on the community instead of political 
elections approach their role as a mobilizing structure in a different way. 
The Muslim paradigm, while clearly on the ascent, is likewise limited in 
its capacity to form a new focus for Palestinian self-perception.  As 
elsewhere, emerging technologies and new transnational communication 
networks notwithstanding, youngsters seek to articulate identity and 
solidarity in terms of secular, local and national paradigms.  The Islamic 
movements in the territories and inside Israel do not offer a radical 
alternative to national identity.  Their strength hinges on their promise to 
provide a more determined and effective pursuit of the nationalist agenda 
and, in the case of youngsters and territories, a more empowering way to 
cope with the humiliation and oppression of daily life under occupation.128  
Regardless of its non-participation in national elections, Sheikh Salah’s Islamic 
movement has a strong following that he has attempted to mobilize in the past.  One such 
time was in March of 2007 when the fiery sheikh “called on Muslims to stage an uprising 
against Israel as it move[d] ahead with plans to replace a crumbling dirt ramp” that led 
into the compound known as the Temple Mount to Jews and the Noble Sanctuary to 
Muslims.129  Salah was arrested soon afterward for “scuffling with an Israeli police 
officer” and trying to incite trouble.  The sheikh had already been arrested and jailed in 
2003 on charges of raising money for Hamas which resulted in his label as a “ticking 
time bomb” by several Jewish MKs.130  Although Salah has numerous followers within 
the Islamic movement, the protests at the construction site never resulted in an uprising.  
To Israel’s dismay, the majority of Israeli Arabs agreed with Sheikh Salah’s actions 
despite disagreement with many of his conservative religious and political views.  The 
dissent felt toward Israel has caused many Israeli Arabs to take the side of anyone who 
stands up against the state regardless of the cause.  The only problem is that most Arabs  
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are unwilling to get directly involved for fear of repercussions from the state.  So they 
might donate money, boycott elections, or stage a protest but the results are usually 
limited and temporary at best.   
 The Islamic movement is an influential mobilizing structure within Arab society 
because it has invested large amounts of time and money in several Arab towns and 
villages.  In turn, its constituency is likely to show more loyalty than that of a normal 
political party.  Israeli Arabs did not rally around Sheikh Salah at the construction site 
because it was not an opportunity that would resonate with enough people to force 
collective action.  Given the proper frames and a well timed political opportunity, the 
Islamic movement could serve as an effective mobilizing structure.  The organization’s 
ability to stage large protests against the state has deemed it as “the most radical anti-
Israel group in Israel” according to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.131                 
 Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) or the Party of Liberation is a worldwide Islamic 
organization that has been around since the early 1950s, but has limited its activities in 
Gaza and the West Bank until recent years.  Many of the group’s ideological beliefs are 
seen as radical, but its strategic goals are conservative. 
The party rejects contemporary efforts to establish Islamic states, claiming 
that Sudan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia do not meet the necessary criteria.  
Instead, Hizb ut-Tahrir wants to reestablish the Islamic state that existed in 
the seventh century under the Prophet Muhammad and his first four 
successors.  This state would be led by a Caliph, a supreme leader who 
would combine religious and political power, elected by an assembly, 
which would in turn be elected by the people.  The Caliph would appoint 
an Amir, or military leader, who would declare jihad against non-Muslim 
countries.132 
These beliefs may seem radical for Arab residents of Israel and maybe even Palestinians 
in the occupied territories.  Nevertheless, the support gained by HT could be due to a lack 
of faith in the Israeli political process or abandonment of hope for a two state solution in 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  The residents of the occupied territories have also 
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been disappointed by the inefficiency and eternal conflict between the Palestinian 
Authority, Hamas, and Fatah. Although the majority of supporters have come from the 
occupied territories, there are many Israeli Arabs who have attended HT sponsored 
gatherings as well.  In the past, Israeli Arabs have collectively mobilized around protests 
that occurred in the occupied territories, so this new player in the Palestinian power 
struggle could potentially introduce new forms of mobilizing structures to rally Arabs on 
both sides of Israel’s green line.      
 Founded in 1953 by Taqim al-Din al-Nabhani, Hizb ut-Tahrir thrived on the 
unstable environment of the Middle East where receptive and impoverished audiences 
had turned away from the corrupt and illegitimate structures of the state.  After failed 
coup attempts in Jordan and Iraq, the group went underground in the Middle East after 
1972.  HT has always had a following in the occupied territories and the current struggle 
between Hamas and Fatah has presented an opportunity for HT to obtain a stronger 
foothold in the area.  The organization has also utilized the extensive attention and media 
coverage given to Hamas and Fatah to slip under Israel’s radar in West Bank and Gaza.  
An Israeli commentator on Palestinian affairs stated that “since the group eschews 
violence, preferring instead to wait for some ‘coup de grace’ in the form of a divinely 
ordained moment of international jihad, Israeli and Palestinian security forces have not 
viewed them as a major threat…but they are not a vegetarian movement.”133  Middle 
Eastern countries are more concerned about HT’s political ideology of overthrowing 
existing governments than their lack of violence.  As a result, the group has been banned 
in most of the Middle East which led to its emergence in other regions.  A commitment to 
non-violence enables HT to thrive in various parts of the world, to include western 
democracies, where violent groups are outlawed.134  In contrast to its non-violent stance, 
the group does not believe in peace talks with Israel and also supports the overthrow of 
the Jewish state along with all other western backed Middle East regimes. There are three 
main factors that increase the likelihood of HT’s ability to start a social movement among 
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Israel’s Arab minority.  The group does not condone violence, it “has shown it can put 
tens of thousands of supporters into the streets,” and its leaders understand that timing is 
a vital key to collective action.135  These attributes are similar to the concepts of 
mobilizing structures and political opportunity within the SMT framework.  The addition 
of strategic framing is applicable to HT’s ability to convince its members that protest is 
worthwhile. 
 Due to its experience as a worldwide movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a 
considerable advantage over both Hamas and Fatah.  The organization’s understanding of 
social mobilization has grown from experiences in over forty five countries.136  The 
extensive knowledge of symbols, framing, and opportunity that HT has amassed in the 
numerous cultures of its constituency would surely give it an advantage in mobilizing the 
residents in the occupied territories.  The group has not realized its main goal of an 
Islamic state in any of the countries where its message is spread, but people are listening 
and joining.  Furthermore, every leader of the organization has been a Palestinian and HT 
receives considerable support from Palestinians whether they are in the diaspora, the 
occupied territories, or within Israel itself.137  Recent events have served as warning signs 
that HT is planning to join the political fray in the West Bank and Gaza.  Several HT 
rallies took place in Ramallah, Tul Karm, and Gaza in 2007 and members of the group 
have gradually taken over the prayer services at Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa mosque.  The group 
has also “launched a youth movement to compete with those of Hamas and Fatah, called 
Ashbal al-Khilafa, the Lion Cubs of the Caliphate.”138  As the group becomes more 
engrained in Palestinian society, its ideology and beliefs will spread to Israeli Arabs as 
well.  The potential of Hizb ut-Tahrir to become a mobilizing structure for Israeli Arabs 
is dependent on the group’s success at mobilizing the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories.  As the political climate continues to worsen in West Bank and Gaza, people  
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will grow frustrated and possibly turn to HT as the only alternative to the status quo.  A 
Palestinian resident of Ramallah explained his reasons for supporting Hizb ut-Tahrir with 
the following statement. 
It’s only natural that people feel threatened by the PA and look at it as a 
collaborator.  People feel the Palestinian Authority is not with the people.  
Hamas started with a similar ideology, but time has proven that the 
liberation of Palestine is not going to go according to Hamas’ route, 
through resistance.  At the same time, Palestinians don’t think that the 
answer lies in Fatah’s approach – a negotiated settlement with foreign 
intervention and aid.  The only route is with the march of armies under the 
rule of the caliph.  Anything else, including tit-for-tat violence and 
especially peace talks, is a waste of time.  Talks are not only useless and 
futile, but they’re very destructive.  These negotiations are geared to 
protect the security of Israel.  The majority of people support this view and 
support Hizb ut-Tahrir.139      
HT’s patient outlook of waiting for the right opportunity and its refusal to participate in 
political elections might make it difficult to maintain overwhelming support in the 
occupied territories over the long run; however, its supporters are continuing to grow in 
the short run. 
 The amount of potential mobilizing structures within Israeli Arab society is 
innumerable and the groups mentioned above are just some of the key players.  McCarthy 
states that “in any concrete social setting, a range of mobilizing structural elements are 
more or less available to activists as they attempt to create new movements or nurture and 
direct ongoing ones.”140  Family ties, friendship and work networks, neighborhoods, etc., 
are all readily available as mobilizing structures and successful activists have the ability 
to determine which ones can actually further their cause.  Only time will tell if the Arab 
Student Unions, Palestinian NGOs, or the Islamic organizations will properly utilize the 
mobilizing structures at their disposal both inside and outside of Israel.  Recent events 
have shown that they are all learning from the past and developing new methods of 
countering the Israeli government.       
 
                                                 
139 Prusher, 3. 
140 McCarthy, 147. 
 48
C. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
In Israel, the political atmosphere is ruthless as politicians conduct vicious 
personal attacks and make outrageous ideological statements in order to sway public 
opinion.  The prime minister and the ruling party have enormous power while the losing 
party has close to none.  Military service is seen with high regard and the majority of 
influential government officials have previously held top ranks in the IDF.  This explains 
the aggressive and militant nature of Israeli domestic and foreign policy.  Israeli politics 
has always been dominated by ideological concerns and “the use of symbols, rhetoric, 
and coded phrases…is not likely to diminish soon.”141  National security is consistently 
given the highest priority and many discriminatory laws are introduced in the Knesset 
due to the perceived Arab threat to the Jewish nature of the state.  While there is a long 
list of common hardships that Israeli Arabs must face each day, many of the events are 
slowly pushing them toward collective action.  Tarrow describes political opportunity 
structure as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the 
political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success or failure.”142  Important political and social 
events that have influenced the identity of the Stand-Tall generation are the 1999 election 
for Prime Minister, the political discussions of Arab land and population transfer, and the 
increasing anti-Arab sentiment among government officials.   
The Prime Minister election of 1999 is still viewed with utter disgust by most 
Arab citizens of Israel.  The circumstances and results of the election were covered 
earlier in this paper, but a discussion of the lasting repercussions is necessary.  Starting 
with the Arab boycott of elections in 2001, the minority’s faith in the political process has 
continued to decrease.  While some Arabs turned away from mainstream political parties 
like Likud and Labor and decided to support less powerful Arab parties like Balad, others 
have given up on politics completely.  Before elections in March of 2006, Hanan 
Ihsaniya, a college student, voiced a common viewpoint among the Stand-Tall generation 
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when she stated “we always vote, but we don’t see results.”143  The democratic process 
will always produce a number of disgruntled people whose party lost the most recent 
election, but the Arab case in Israel is different.  Even when the party they vote for wins, 
it does not always feel obligated to represent them.  Many Arabs view the political 
process as a voice for only Jews and they are seeking change outside of the government.  
The “instability of political alignments” that is created when political parties fail to 
address their Arab constituency is an important aspect of opportunity structure.144  
Furthermore, it has created an excellent opportunity for movement leaders as they seek to 
fill the gap left by the political process.  Islamic groups that reject the democratic process 
like Hizb ut-Tahrir and the southern faction of the Islamic Movement have benefited 
from Israel’s consistent failure to accommodate its Arab population in the political arena. 
Several aspects of the situation indicate that [violence] is possible.  One is 
the electoral boycott of 2001, followed by the fall to 64 percent in Arab 
electoral participation in 2003, and 56 percent in 2006.  This may indicate 
that a significant portion of the Arab population does not consider that 
democracy as it is implemented in Israel is a good way to advance their 
political program.  Another aspect is the growing popularity of the radical 
wing of the Islamic Movement headed by Ra’id Salah.  Finally, while 
terrorist violence remains a marginal phenomenon, it has gained more 
adherents among the [Israeli] Arabs tha[n] it ever had before.145    
It is true that the Islamic Movement and other religious groups do not find a captivated 
audience in all segments of the Israeli Arab population, but the Arab population will be 
more willing to open their minds to radical messages if the Israeli system continues to 
alienate them.  
 Land is a sensitive subject in Israel for Jews and Arabs since both groups use it as 
the foundation of their national identity.  Palestinian Arabs believe they were unjustly 
forced off their land in 1948 and 1967.  In contrast, Israeli Jews believe forcing the Arabs 
out of Israel was based on national security since Israel was at war against surrounding 
Arab countries.  Both arguments place land at the heart of the issue.  Likewise, land and 
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population transfer is a Jewish solution to the Arab demographic problem in Israel that 
has always been discussed by the government in private, but in recent years the 
controversial topic has entered the public realm.  Population transfer implies the stripping 
of citizenship from Arab citizens of Israel and transferring them outside of Israel’s 
borders.  Land transfer refers to placing Israeli Arab land under the sovereignty of the 
Palestinian Authority in order to continue the construction of Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank.  “On posters and billboards, in taxi cabs and living rooms, and on radio and 
television, ethnic cleansing is advocated not only for suppressing Palestinian resistance in 
the Occupied Territories but also for neutralizing the calls of Palestinian citizens of Israel 
for equality.  Even if mass deportations never occur, the discussion of transfer itself 
constitutes a weight on Israel’s Palestinian citizens, reminding them at every turn that 
they are but temporary residents in their own land.”146  Before the resurgence of talks on 
transfer, the Israeli government was balancing the demography of Arab dominated areas 
by providing incentives for Jewish settlers to move into the region in question.  However, 
international pressure on Israel to reduce its settlement activity has left the Jewish 
majority seeking other means to counter the demographic threat.  Based on the 
discriminatory solutions that have been considered by the Knesset, the government is 
placing the Jewish description of the state above its democratic nature.  While these 
measures could possibly give the Jewish majority a false sense of security, they strike 
fear in the hearts of the Arab minority which creates opportunity for movement 
organizers.        
 The most recent controversies surrounding land issues deal with illegal Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank.  According to international law, it is illegal for Israel to 
settle on land that was seized during war, in this case, the 1967 war.  Even as U.S. 
President George Bush visited Israel in January 2008 and told the Israeli government to 
“get rid of unauthorized settlements,” settlers were busy building more structures in the 
West Bank.147  Israel has been reluctant to release the exact number of settlements for 
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fear of reprisals from the international community.148  Settlers have claimed several 
parcels of land that are rightfully owned by Palestinians who have the documents to 
prove it.  The court system may rule in the Palestinians’ favor, but getting the 
government to force the settlers off the private land is another story.  One such 
Palestinian named Badriya Amer was chased off her land by gun-wielding settlers and is 
waiting on the courts to rule in her favor.  “I put my faith in God, not in courts, but I have 
no other option.”149  At this point, many Israeli Arabs like Amer have lost faith in the 
Israeli political system as well as the court system due to blatant anti-Arab bias.  The 
government denies any kind of support to the non-government sponsored settlements and 
outposts, but “it has played a major role in planning, funding and encouraging some of 
them.  Many draw power from the main Israeli grid and receive other public services, 
including water supply.”150   
Aside from settlements and the discussion of transfer, political opportunities for 
Arab collective action present themselves every time an Israeli government official 
spouts off anti-Arab rhetoric through an official forum.  Since the second intifada began 
in 2000, there has been an abundance of discriminatory propaganda spread by both 
elected and appointed government officials.  When an Israeli Arab experiences 
discrimination on the street, he can downplay it as an isolated incident that will not affect 
his rights as an Israeli citizen.  In contrast, the common use of blatant discriminatory and 
racist language by Jewish government officials makes the Arab minority feel deeply 
threatened.  The following quotes by various government officials and important figures 
in Israeli society are evidence of the hostile atmosphere that Arabs face. 
If you continue like this, you [Palestinians] will wind up with things much 
worse than the revocation of citizenship, you will wind up with mass 
expulsions.  If you don’t stop this way of yours, the Jewish majority will 
simply scatter you to the winds.151        
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- MK Uri Ariel’s response to an Arab MK’s criticism of the Interior 
Minister for revoking the citizenship of Arab citizens accused of 
planning terrorist attacks (September, 2002) 
 
The Arabs in Israel are a ticking time bomb…[T]hey resemble a cancerous 
growth.  We shall have to consider the ability of the Israeli democracy to 
continue the Arabs’ participation.152 
- Leader of the National Religious Party, MK Efraim Eitam (March, 
2002)   
 
In Israel, the Arabs do not exist.  They are transparent.  They are not seen.  
The very word ‘Arab’ has commonly been thought to be so offensive in 
Hebrew that newspapers often use the term ‘minorities instead.  The 
phrase ‘Arab labor’ is also pejorative.  At first, it was thought impolite to 
employ an Arab instead of a Jew.  But it changed.  If you made a mistake 
or did something wrong in your labor, it became ‘Arab work.’  But this is 
just daily racism.  The most important thing is the power relationship.153 
- Israeli poet, author, and Haaretz columnist Yitzhak Laor (2006) 
 
What [Labor leader] Amir Peretz did this morning is to swing an 
enormous ax at the tree called Zionism.  We need to drive out and destroy 
this evil from our environs.  The State of Israel is a Jewish state that is 
supposed to be ruled by Jewish values, with a Jewish regime and Jewish 
sovereignty.154 
- MK Esterina Tartman’s response to Labor’s appointment of Israel’s 
first-ever Arab cabinet minister (January 2007)  
 
[A]ll the rights over the Land of Israel are Jewish rights.  In the Land of 
Israel, all the rights must be given to the people who live here.  That is the 
difference between rights over the Land and rights in the Land.155 
-    Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s response when asked about inequality   
     between Arabs and Jews by an Arab MK. (July 2002) 
 
There is a huge gap between us [Jews] and our enemies not just in ability 
but in morality, culture, sanctity of life, and conscience.  They are our 
neighbors here, but it seems as if at a distance of a few hundred meters 
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away there are people who do not belong to our continent, to our world, 
but actually belong to a different galaxy.156 
- Israeli President Moshe Katzav (May 2001) 
 
If you ask me, Israel’s number one problem is not the Palestinian problem; 
it is first of all [the problem of] Arab citizens of the State of Israel…Do I  
Consider them citizens of the State of Israel?  No!...They have to find a 
place where they will feel comfortable.157 
- MK Avigdor Lieberman (December 2001) 
 
The above statements are suitable for a hated enemy of the state and not its own citizens.  
For Israel’s Arab population, the line separating the two descriptions seems to fade a little 
more each day.   
 Political opportunities for Arab mobilization present themselves almost everyday 
in Israel but they become more difficult for movement leaders to exploit once the Arab 
minority grows desensitized to government sponsored discrimination.  Radical comments 
by government officials like Lieberman and Eitam initially strike fear in the hearts of 
Arab citizens; however, the population eventually becomes desensitized to such rhetoric 
and thinks of it as politics as usual.  “Pervasive, casual discrimination has become an 
accepted facet of daily life in Israel, no longer provoking outrage.”158  In order to 
describe the deadening of the senses to radical undertones in the Israeli government, Fred 
Lazin, the head of the government and politics department at Ben-Gurion University, 
said, “In the past, these people would be thought of as extremist.  Now they aren’t even 
asked to leave the government.”159  While Israeli Arabs may have learned to tune out the 
negative comments of government officials and society at large, a sense of hopelessness 
is evident in their ranks.  Their citizenship, in many ways, has little meaning and they are 
reminded of it with every snide remark that emerges from the Jewish majority.  The loss 
of dignity and self-respect that accompanies discrimination opens the door to groups who  
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provide alternatives to the Israeli state apparatus.  If Israel continues to create 
opportunities for mobilization by treating its Arab citizens as enemies of the state, then it 




Israel has been defending its borders from external threats since 1948 and the 
outlook for peace with its Arab neighbors remains bleak.  The uncompromising stance 
that Israel takes with its own Arab citizens provides a glimpse into the difficulty of 
forging a peace treaty with the neighboring Arab states.  If the Jewish majority refuses to 
trust its own Arab citizens, then there is little hope for Israel ever making a lasting peace 
with Palestinians and Arabs outside of its borders.  The Jewish majority justifies sixty 
years of discrimination against its Arab minority through security concerns and 
primordial claims to the land.  Israeli Arabs are not protesting because they are 
ideologically inclined to hate Jews, but because they are treated as enemies in their own 
state.  Many Arab citizens are still bitter at the state for various historical grievances and 
their viewpoints would most likely moderate if they were treated as equals.  Security and 
distrust of Arabs has become an ideological sticking point in the minds of the Jewish 
population and it cannot be overcome with the current policies that are in place.  
Unfortunately, Israel has created its own internal problem with its Arab citizens and the 
future looks grim when politicians are willing to discuss population transfer before the 
consideration of equal rights.  Political change is unlikely because any government 
official is labeled as a traitor for showing favor to the Arab population within the Jewish 
state.  Social mobilization is the only option that remains for the Arab citizens of Israel to 
gain equality among the Jewish majority.  Even though it is the only remaining option, 
collective action is still a difficult concept.  Israel’s history of successful conventional 
wars against Arab states has engrained the ideal in Israeli society that “might makes 
right” and the willingness of the IDF to use lethal force against Arab citizens on several 
occasions shows that anything less than total and complete social mobilization is doomed 
to fail.    
On the international stage, the dilemma faced by Israeli Arabs is completely 
overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The democratic government in Israel is 
an effective façade for the ethnocentric intentions of the state.  Arab citizens can 
participate in elections and even serve in the Knesset, but their influence is minimized by 
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the Jewish majority.  In theory, Arabs with legal disputes can take their cases to the 
Israeli court system and receive a fair trial.  For example, there are several landmark 
rulings by the Israeli Supreme Court that have expanded land rights to Arab citizens and 
theoretically paved the way for equality between Jews and Arabs.  These rulings are used 
by the Israeli government to show the world that all citizens in the Jewish state enjoy 
equal rights.  In reality, the world does not see the Israeli government’s failure to enforce 
the new rulings at the local level.  One such example is a Supreme Court ruling in 2000 
that stated all Israeli citizens, including Arabs, can live wherever they choose in Israel.  
Since the ruling, Jewish members of Knesset have made several attempts to circumvent 
the high court’s decision.160  Furthermore, the ruling was never enforced at the local 
level.  The same pattern is evident in Israel’s attitude toward illegal settlements in the 
occupied territories.  The Israeli military has forced Jewish settlers off Palestinian land in 
the past, the most popular example was the clearing of Gaza in 2005, but attempts in 
recent years are half hearted or non-existent.161    So despite Israel’s outward appearance 
of democracy, it still lacks many of the equal rights and opportunities that are common in 
such a government.       
Arab collective action in Israel is dependent on the three main components of 
social movement theory.  The second intifada failed because structures, frames and 
opportunities were not properly utilized simultaneously.  The Palestinian leadership may 
have excelled in one aspect, but failed in another.  Ariel Sharon created the opportunity 
for Arab mobilization by visiting Haram al-Sharif and numerous mobilizing structures 
were available to get the protesters out in the streets.  As time went on and the anger over 
Sharon’s actions was replaced with fear of IDF reprisals, there was a lack of effective 
frames to maintain the high level of Israeli Arab protest.  Finding frames that resonate 
with all Palestinians, whether they are in Israel, the occupied territories, or the diaspora is 
a difficult challenge because the context of each group is different.  Israeli Arabs would 
need the numerical strength of a unified social movement involving all three groups in 
order to achieve success.  Each group needs to understand how it could potentially 
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benefit from Israeli Arabs achieving equal rights in Israel.  A method used by the Islamic 
movement on the local level is to exploit the lack of self-respect and pride that plagues 
Palestinians due to the Israeli occupation.  Such a frame, if utilized by a mainstream 
movement, would resonate with the majority of Palestinians around the world.  If 
movement organizers cannot develop the right symbols and slogans or adapt existing 
ones to the changing environment, then their cause will continually fail to resonate with 
the movement itself.  The current Israeli blockade of Gaza has triggered several protests 
in the occupied territories, but the Arab population in Israel has yet to take an active role.  
If they miss this chance to gain support through protests that started in the occupied 
territories, there are sure to be many more opportunities in the future.    
Some scholars have compared the situation of Israeli Arabs to apartheid in South 
Africa, a subject that is still sensitive to many people around the world.  Zreik explains 
the powerful simplicity of the frames used by the anti-apartheid movement.  
Their demands, clear-cut and neat, were articulated with concision and 
clarity.  It was easy to grasp the symmetry that the struggle aimed to 
achieve, where all South Africans would share the same basic rights; the 
imagined symmetry itself conveyed the asymmetry of the apartheid 
situation.  By the showing the whole, one can see what is missing – the 
absent rights of the black community became clear, concrete, framed, and 
(as such) visible.162   
For the most part, Arab and Jewish neighborhoods are separated from one another and 
state funding for various education and development programs is much higher in Jewish 
sectors.  The new security wall that separates Israel from the occupied territories also 
resembles behavior from the apartheid era in South Africa.  Frames that resonate within 
the Israeli Arab own population will have limited success on the international stage and 
the opposite is also true.  When the world thinks of Palestinians, it immediately pictures 
Palestinians in the occupied territories along with all the frames that have been 
constructed by Palestinian nationalism.  An independent Palestinian state is the main 
ideal that comes to mind and equal rights for Arab citizens of Israel are seldom 
considered.  The mention of the term   “Palestinians in Israel” will most likely garner a 
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similar response.  In order for a frame to truly resonate, people need to understand and 
identify with it immediately without having to look up more information or it must peak 
their interest enough to make them want to become better informed.  Using similar 
frames from the anti-apartheid movement has the potential to attract that kind of 
response.           
As this paper has argued, discrimination is pushing Israel’s Arab population away 
from the political arena and toward a tighter embrace of Palestinian nationalism and the 
frames that accompany it.  Israeli Arab movement leaders can capitalize on existing 
frames by tailoring them to their own situation.  The organizations capable of acting as 
mobilizing structures are numerous, but their strategies for change vary from one to 
another.  The Islamic movement and Hizb ut-Tahrir strive for change through religious 
and social means while other groups promote politics or violence.  Many organizations 
like Arab student unions and Palestinian Israeli NGOs are effective at providing 
information to their members and prepping them for protests.  Unfortunately, the support 
seldom transitions to direct participation in sustained collective action.  Historically, the 
majority of the Arab population has been content with playing the role of supporter rather 
than actor although the trend is slowly changing.  Many mobilizing structures are limited 
to the facilitation of sideline support which means they provide a forum for grievances 
against the state and nothing more.  In order to remain relevant in the Stand-Tall 
generation, many organizations will need to convince their members to take a more active 
role in gaining equal rights. 
Recent events have shown that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will have 
direct results on the Arabs in Israel.  Palestinian and Israeli demands were discussed at 
the Annapolis Conference in November 2007 and the most important topic was an 
independent Palestinian state.  A Palestinian state would mark the culmination of a sixty 
year struggle for many Palestinians, but it would also prove disastrous for many Israeli 
Arabs.  Such a state would provide the ideal location for Israel to forcefully relocate its 
Arab citizens at an opportune time when national security is supposedly at stake.163  
                                                 
163 Eetta Prince-Gibson, “Land (Swap) For Peace?” The Jerusalem Report (November 26, 2007), 43-
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Based on the anti-Arab quotes that were mentioned in the previous chapter, the transfer 
of Israel’s Arab population against their will could be a reality in the future.  
Discrimination would also increase against Israeli Arabs in order to pressure them into 
leaving Israel voluntarily.  Additionally, a Palestinian state would make collective action 
more difficult to achieve among the Israeli Arab population since moving to the new state 
might prove more appealing than risking bodily harm in protests against Israel.   
The Stand-Tall generation has the potential to achieve more for Israeli Arabs than 
any prior generation and the important factor is that many of them realize it.  These 
highly educated and informed Arab citizens can revitalize many of the social movement 
organizations that have been stagnant for several years.  They use their identities as 
Israeli citizens to acquire the knowledge necessary to mobilize through Palestinian 
nationalism.  In other words, they embrace the benefits of their Israeli citizenship, but not 
the identity itself.  Their heightened awareness increases the probability of seeking 
change outside of the ineffective political realm.  Many in the Stand-Tall generation do 
not identify with their Israeli citizenship because, to them, it represents the Jewish nature 
of the state.  The hopes of Israel’s Arab citizens lie on the backs of these members of the 
new generation and their ability to create change beyond the local level.  The members of 
the Stand-Tall generation that have embraced their Israeli identity are still an important 
component of collective action as well.  Demographics are just as important for an Arab 
social movement as they are to the Jewish majority.  Israeli Arabs could muster 
overwhelming amounts of outside support for an equal rights movement but it would be a 
major setback if the majority of their educated elites were not mobilized.  The Palestinian 
people on both sides of the green line have dealt with so much repression since 1948 that 
their capacity for suffering makes it difficult to determine a definite tipping point for 
collective action.  Historic trends show that Israel will continue to rely on costly 
measures to maintain the status quo, so it is up to the Israeli Arabs within the emerging 
Stand-Tall generation to demonstrate that they are willing to pay a higher cost to change 
it.              
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